Large Cardinals, Inner Models, and Determinacy:An Introductory Overview by Welch, Philip D
                          Welch, P. D. (2015). Large Cardinals, Inner Models, and Determinacy: An
Introductory Overview. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 56(1), 213-
242. DOI: 10.1215/00294527-2835083
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1215/00294527-2835083
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Project Euclid at http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1427202981. Please refer to any applicable terms of use
of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Large Cardinals, Inner Models and Determinacy: an
introductory overview
P.D. Welch
School of Mathematics, University of Bristol, England,
Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge, England
p.welch@bristol.ac.uk1
Abstract. The interaction between large cardinals, determinacy of two person perfect information games, and inner
model theory has been a singularly powerful driving force in modern set theory during the last three decades. For
the outsider the intellectual excitement is often tempered by the somewhat daunting technicalities, and the seeming
length of study needed to understand the flow of ideas. The purpose of this article is to try and give a short, albeit
rather rough, guide to the broad lines of development.
1 Introduction
The following article grew out of a series of three tutorials at the conference on the development
of large cardinal hypothesis and their connections to proofs of the determinacy of two person per-
fect information Gale-Stewart games. The intention was to give a perspective, not to specialists
in set theory, who in any case either would have no need for such, or would know where to go find
it, but to those interested in the foundations of set theory already with some technical knowledge
of Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatics, and the construction of Go¨del’s universe L, but who may not
have seen a systematic production of the hierarchy of increasing strong axioms of infinity arising
from embeddings of the universe V and in particular the connections of these axioms with the
descriptive set theory of the real continuum. It was hoped that the lectures would provide a fast
ascent without oxygen to some of the peaks of the last twenty years. In this we believed that a
lot could be learnt, not in detail, nor even attempting to provide a working knowledge (for which
a longer term devotion would be required, and again for which there are thorough texts) but that
would bring about at least some familiarity with the technical tools, and some insight as to why
they had been developed, and how they had been used.
We should also like to urge the reader to study Jensen’s masterly, and non-technical, overview
[9] if he or she has not already done so.
1.1 Overview
The roots of modern set theory lie surprisingly deep in the history of the subject, although it is
admittedly rather young compared to other areas of mathematics. It is well known that it con-
cerns itself still with the question that vexed its founding father: Cantor’s Continuum Problem
(or Hypothesis, hence CH) that any set of real numbers is either equinumerous with all of R
or is countable. However some of the early analysts such as the those from the French school,
Lebesgue, Borel, Baire, and then the Russians, Luzin and more particularly Suslin, introduced
both further questions and new methods of representation that are still key today. Today de-
scriptive set theory is that branch of set theory which seeks to investigate, not the whole real
1The author would like to warmly thank the organisers of the meeting for the opportunity to give these lectures.
He would also like to thank the Isaac Newton Institute where these notes were completed whilst the author was a long
term Fellow on the program ‘Syntax and Semantics.’
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continuum, but definable parts or fragments of it. In doing this two things are achieved: (i) one
may concentrate on perhaps simpler parts of the continuum for which the questions are more
tractable and (ii) the definable parts are rather concretely given, and as such the results proven
may give more definite information to the analyst who is uninterested in foundational questions.
At the same time this gives clues to the most general question concerning the whole continuum.
The roots of descriptive set theory can also be traced back to Cantor himself: he first tried (and
succeeded) to solve the CH for closed sets. His ambition was to proceed through increasingly
complicated sets, until, somehow he had conquered the whole continuum. He, and Bernstein,
showed that a closed set is the union of a perfect set with a countable set of isolated points. Thus
closed sets enjoyed the “perfect subset property” (PSP). CH for closed sets follows: if a closed
set is uncountable the perfect part is non-empty and can easily be shown to be equinumerous
with R. Borel defined a hierarchy of more complicated sets: one starts with the class of open
sets at the base level, and then builds up levels by the process of taking complementation and
countable unions of the sets created so far. This Borel Hierarchy is built in precisely ω1-many
stages, and was much studied. It was found that PSP holds for Borel sets.
Suslin then showed the same for the analytic, orΣ11 sets (more detailed definitions are below,
but an analytic subset of R (depicted on the x-axis), is one that is the projection of a Borel set in
the x, y-plane down to that x-axis). This can be seen as a further step in Cantor’s original plan:
now any analytic set satisfies CH. However the program stopped there. Later Go¨del was to show
that in L, his constructible hierarchy, although CH was true, co-analytic orΠ11 sets failed to have
the PSP. Hence it was consistent with the axioms of ZFC that PSP failed at this level. Hence the
analysts had gone as far as they could have done using analytical techniques. However the PSP is
only an example of one of several properties. The property of being Lebesgue Measurable (LM)
was also shown to hold for first Borel, then analytic (and since complements of measurable sets
are measurable too, also co-analytic) sets. Similarly for the Baire property (BP, that is, a set A
with the Baire property is almost an open set, in that there is an open set O so that the symmetric
difference of the two sets A and O is ‘thin’, in the sense of being the union of countably many
nowhere dense sets), and moreover for the Uniformisation Property: that co-analytic regions
of the plane could be uniformized by co-analytic functions. Together this clutch of properties
became (more recently) collectively known as the regularity properties. Again the BP and LM
could both consistently fail for the same reason as for the PSP: in the Go¨del universe ∆12 sets
failed to have them.
Proceeding in another direction Banach had considered Lebesgue’s problem of defining a
translation-invariant countably additive measure on R. He replaced the translation-invariance
part of the requirement with that of asking the measure of a single point be non-zero. Was such
a measure possible? Again this was ruled out by an Axiom of Choice construction, as Vitali had
shown would happen for any measure satisfying Lebesgue’s requirements. However Banach’s
requirements allowed one to generalise away from P(R) to consider measures on P(S) for any
set S (Banach 1930). The additivity of such a measure, were it to exist, would be that of the
cardinality of S. If such existed for an uncountable set S, with |S| = κ then κ was called real-
valued measurable. Ulam (1930) showed that a real-valued measurable cardinal was weakly
inaccessible in Hausdorff’s sense. If the measure was atomless then 2ℵ0 > κ. In this way large
cardinals and measures enter the scene. Ulam also defined the ultimately more consequential
notion of a 2-valued measure κ-additive measure. With Tarski the cardinals κ admitting such
measures on their power sets were shown to be strongly inaccessible, but not until the work of
Hanf (1964) was it shown that the least measurable cardinal could not be the least inaccessible.
3Shortly thereafter Scott used the technique of ultrapowers from model theory to show that the
existence of a measurable cardinal implied V 6= L (Theorem 2.5 (1961) below). This technique
has become ubiquitous in modern set theory, with the realisation that a measurable cardinal
allows an ultrapower of the whole universe V into some proper inner model M , with a first
order truth-preserving elementary embedding: j : V −→e M . Embeddings of the universe
V with stronger properties arose from the work of Solovay and of Reinhardt, and these were
defined using ultrafilters on different base sets. The cardinals that were the first point moved,
or the critical point of such embeddings were called supercompact, and the embeddings they
produced had markedly different aspects to those from simple measures alone. Together with
large cardinals defined from other differing directions, these would eventually all be seen to lie
in a well ordered spectrum of increasing strength giving rise to stronger and stronger embedding
properties, which to a first approximation can be said to be about how much of V is carried over
into the target model M . (We give definitions of the more prominent of these again below).
“Inner Models” in this account are transitive class models of ZFC (this can be given a first
order formulation). Go¨del’s L was the first inner model to be discovered (besides V itself of
course). Relativised constructibility is easy to define: one enlarges the language of set theory to
include (one or more) additional predicates into the first order Definability operator. Thus models
〈L[µ],∈, µ〉 where µ is a two valued κ-additive measure on some κ may be defined. Solovay
defined such and their properties were investigated by Silver and Kunen. L[µ] was seen to be a
generalisation of L: GCH held and there was a global well order of its universe. The definability
of that well order on its real continuum was however ∆13 rather than ∆
1
2 which had been the case
for L.
Other generalised notions of definability were possible: instead of definability relative to a
predicate one may start with a set R and define:




The universe L(R) =
⋃
α∈On Lα(R) is then an inner model of ZF (not necessarily AC as
there is not necessarily a well order ofR definable over any of the levels Lα(R)). ForR = R this
has been a model of tremendous importance as we shall see. One can regard it as a laboratory for
very generalised notions of definability over analysis: it contains the projective sets of analysis
right down at the bottom, and allows for definitions over analysis but containing more and more
ordinals.
There was a further striking result concerning measurability.
Theorem 1.1 (Solovay (1965)) (ZFC) If there is a measurable cardinal, then allΣ12 sets of reals
have the regularity properties of LM, BP, PSP.
This was probably the first indication that large cardinals could really influence how the
continuum would look to an analyst: by assuming some measure on some remote cardinal the
nature of Vω+1 is fundamentally different.
However researchers were already deriving the regularity properties from a quite unexpected
quarter. This was the notion of a two person perfect information game (see Def. 3.1 below.)
Curiously Zermelo had first published on the existence of winning strategies for finite games, but
Polish mathematicians such as Steinhaus, Banach and Mazur in the 1920’s took up the question
of infinite length games. As an example such a game GA is based on a subset A ⊆ ωω (the
‘payoff set’) and then two players alternate choosing integers n0,m0, n1,m1, . . . (with perfect
knowledge of the other’s moves) and after ω-many moves, the mutually constructed infinite
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sequence z ∈ ωω may or may not lie in A. If it does player I is deemed to have own. Otherwise
player II wins.
It was then asked for which payoff sets A, could a player have a winning strategy (in the ob-
vious sense)? In their formulations R was taken as ωω with moves taken from ω. In descriptive
set theory it is usual to consider the reals as ωω rather than the Euclidean R: ωω is homeomor-
phic to the irrationals, and only the countable set of rationals is ‘omitted’. Moreover the topology
determined by finite sequences (see below) is very conducive to descriptive set theoretical argu-
ments: the resulting Baire space is an example of a well-studied space, being a Polish space,
i.e. a separable complete metric space; moreover it is homeomorphic to the direct product of any
finite number of copies of itself. Questions of dimension are thus made irrelevant: proving a
result about the descriptive set theory of the one-dimensional space ωω, in general one has the
result for the k-dimensional (ωω)k.
With this topology one sees that if A ⊆ ωω is an open set, and Player I has a winning
strategy, then any run of the game using that strategy has essentially been won by I by a finite
stage. Mazur had already conjectured the connection between the class of A for which the
games GA are determined games (meaning one of the players has a winning strategy) and the
Baire property for that class. This was proven by Banach in 1935.
We now know that determinacy implies the regularity properties. Let Γ be a class of subsets
of ωω. If GA is determined for all A ∈ Γ we write ‘Det(Γ)’. If Γ has some minimal closure
properties (this is ‘adequacy’ in Moschovakis’s terminology [23]) which we shall not define here,
but are enjoyed by all the definable projective classes Σ1n,Π
1
n etc, then as the combined work
of Banach, Mazur, Oxtoby (BP), Mycielski-Swierczkovski (LM), Davis (PSP) (all by 1964)
showed:
Theorem 1.2 (ZFC) Assume Det(Γ). Then all sets in Γ have the regularity properties BP, LM,
PSP.
Actually some more can be extracted from these proofs: assuming Det(Γ) the point class
∃RΓ also enjoys these regularity properties. Here ∃RΓ is the point class of projections of sets
A ∈ Γ. (Here it is particularly useful to be able to prove results simultaneously in any finite
dimension.) That is B ∈ ∃RΓ iff ∃A ∈ Γ B = {x | ∃y(x, y) ∈ A}.
By Martin’s result on Borel Determinacy, in other words, that ZFC ` Det(∆11) (Theorem
3.8 below), we thus have the regularity properties for ∃R∆11 =Σ11. (See below for the definition
of these classes within the projective hierarchy; in brief the projective sets are those definable in
analysis, that is definable over the standard model of second order number theory.) The conclu-
sion of the regularity properties for Σ11 is of course nothing more than the work of the earlier
analysts. However now we have that Det(Π11) yields them for Σ
1
2.
In short, determinacy is, unexpectedly perhaps, yielding the regularity properties on Baire
space (and this transfers to other complete Polish spaces, such as Cantor space 2ω, as well as
back to the Euclidean R).
Solovay had obtained in 1965 (as mentioned above) the very sameΣ12 regularity results from
a measurable cardinal. It turned out that determinacy for co-analytic sets follows too:
Theorem 1.3 (Martin 1970) (ZFC) The existence of a measurable cardinal implies Det(Π11).
It turned out that Det(Π11) was equivalent to a non-trivial elementary embedding of L to L
(the Martin-Harrington Theorem 3.9 below).
Martin later (1980) went on to show that Det(Π12) followed from the existence of a non-
trivial elementary embedding j : Vλ −→e Vλ. This is one of the strongest hypotheses known for
a large cardinal property, and it led to the feeling that PD, the determinacy of all point classes
5in the projective hierarchy was stronger than all large cardinal hypotheses then known. This was
amplified by Woodin’s result that PD was indeed provable from a hypothesis even stronger than
the one Martin used. Later results, coming from quite a different direction, of Foreman, Magidor
and Shelah showed that a supercompact cardinal (defined below) implied all sets of reals in
L(R) were Lebesgue measurable. This hypothesis was much weaker than the Martin-Woodin
hypotheses, and opened up the possibility that perhaps PD might not be so strong after all, since
LM , being one of its consequences, was not.
So, it was after these results that it was discovered that embeddings of proper inner models
(not of the whole of V into an inner model) are equivalent, broadly speaking, to that of the deter-
minacy of pointclasses within the projective hierarchy (although such had been established for
some point classes strictly within∆12). In the case of a Π
1
1 set A the point was to use a represen-
tation of A as a tree on (finite sequences from) ω × ω<ω in an auxiliary open game. The latter
game would be in a different space of moves but importantly would be an open game there, and
thus would (in ZFC) have a winning strategy σ∗. Indiscernibility (from Silver’s indiscernibles
from the embedding of L to L) was used to ‘integrate out’ a strategy σ for the original integer
game GA from σ∗. This rough scheme applies for the higher pointclasses Π1n: homogeneous
tree representations of the set A were now on ω×ω<λ for larger ordinals λ and the homegeneity
guarantees that there are sufficiently coherent towers of measures on the tree to run the argument.
A subtle kind of cardinal was defined, the Woodin cardinal, which allowed the correct properties
of these trees to be propagated through the increasing complexity of the projective hierarchy.
When the dust settled:
Theorem 1.4 (Martin-Steel 1985) (ZFC)) The existence of n Woodin cardinals with a measur-
able above them all, implies Det(Π1n+1).
Theorem 1.5 (Martin-Steel, Woodin 1985) (ZFC) The existence of infinitely many Woodin car-
dinals with a measurable cardinal above them all, implies ADL(R).
The notion of a Woodin cardinal is much weaker than a supercompact, so the original thought
concerning the consistency strength of PD turned out to be quite incorrect. In fact an exact
equiconsistency obtains (see Theorem 3.19 below). Now we have that large cardinals are suf-
ficient to prove definable determinacy, and that conversely definable determinacy implies the
existence of inner models of those large cardinals. The question arises as to whether we should
wish to adopt definable determinacy as a new ‘axiom’. For a full account of this discussion the
reader is referred to the excellent account of Koellner’s [12], but to summarise:
There is now a point of view that there is a case for assuming projective determinacy, or
PD, as a natural ‘completion’ for the theory of the hereditarily countable sets: if one takes
the theory ZFC−+ PD +“Every set is countable”, then this theory proves that all projective
sets of reals have the regularity properties. Moreover the only sentences (as yet) known to be
independent of the theory are Go¨del-like sentences (cf. [33], [32]). If we move to a more global
perspective and consider ADL(R), then we have a very robust phenomenon concerning it: it
appears (empirically) that any theory extending ZFC of sufficient strength implies it outright
(not just its consistency we emphasise). This is the case of course of theories that are also
themselves mutually inconsistent when put together; but they all have ADL(R) as part of their
common core consequences. If we were ever to choose one such theory as constituting a new
‘axiom’ we should be sure to get ADL(R). Woodin has also shown that ADL(R) is remarkable in
that it is also implied by its consequences:
Theorem 1.6 (Woodin) (ZFC) If all sets of reals enjoy the LM, PSP properties, and Unif(Σ21)
also holds then ADL(R).
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(The latter Uniformisation property also holds in L(R) assuming AD there). We thus cannot
find a different theory or axiom implying the regularity consequences in L(R) without automat-
ically getting AD there. Koellner in [12] makes a comparison with an empirical science: we are
remarkably obtaining back from our ‘empirical consequences’ of the theory, that is the observa-
tions of the regularity properties, the theory itself. This of course does not happen in physical
theories, but the very remarkability of this phenomenon is one reason why many set theorists,
especially those on or near the realist wing, feel that determinacy hypotheses such as ADL(R)
are compelling assertions about the set-theoretical universe.
Woodin has also shown that large cardinals in inner models are obtainable from determinacy
hypotheses.
Theorem 1.7 (Woodin) (ZFC) The theories ZF + AD and ZFC +“There exist infinitely many
Woodin cardinals” are equiconsistent.
There are some equivalents over ZFC for levels of projective determinacy which we shall
not detail here (cf. [13]).
Woodin has also demonstrated a very impressive array of results concerning attempts to
develop a logic, the Ω-logic, that would factor out the baleful effects of the set-forcing indepen-
dence results. One is thus interested in sentences, theories . . . which survive attempts to alter
their truth value by forcing arguments. Such sentences etc. are deemed “generically absolute”.
Theorem 1.8 (Woodin) (ZFC) Assume there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals. Then the
(first order) theory of L(R) is generically absolute. It thus cannot be altered by any set forcing.
See Theorem 3.20 below. In particular as it only requires infinitely many Woodin cardinals
to establish that ADL(R), and as any set forcing will still leave infinitely many Woodin cardinals
intact, every attempt to build a model using (set) forcing techniques will still result in a generic
extension in which AD holds in the L(R) of that generic extension. Now compare that with the
following:
Theorem 1.9 (Woodin) (ZFC) Suppose there is a proper class of inaccessible cardinals and that
the theory of L(R) is generically absolute. Then ADL(R) holds.
As with Theorem 1.6, the last theorem can also be viewed as another recovery theorem:
ADL(R) is being recovered from its consequences. Here we are witnessing that it must hold if
the kind of generic absoluteness that flows from the existence of large cardinals holds true.
1.2 Preliminaries:
Our notation and formalisms are quite standard and can be found in many text books, but in
particular we mention [8] and [10]. We let L∈˙ denote the first order language of set theory;
by ZF we mean a formulation of first order Zermelo-Fraenkel. We occasionally mention the
theory ZF− which is ZF with the power set axiom dropped. For ZF− it is usual to include the
Collection Scheme, rather than the Replacement Scheme, as the latter without Power Set is too
weak to prove some basic facts.
By L∈˙,A˙ we mean the standard language of set theory with an (optional) predicate A˙. In
both these languages we freely make use of terms abstracts t = {z | ϕ(~y, z)} as if they were part
of the languages. ZFA is then a formulation of ZF with instances of the predicate A˙ allowed in
the axioms. A set is transitive, Trans(x), if every element of x is at the same time a subset of x.
The class of all ordinals is denoted On; Sing is the class of singular ordinals; Card is
the class of all cardinals (we assume AC throughout and that cardinals are initial ordinals).
7SingCard, Reg are the classes of singular cardinals and regular cardinals respectively. Inacc
is the class of (strongly) inaccessible cardinals. For a limit ordinal τ , by the “cofinality of τ”,
cf(τ), is meant the least δ so that there is a function f : δ −→ τ with ran(f) unbounded in τ
(τ ∈ Reg then, if cf(τ) = τ ). The rank function,“ρ(x) = α” is ∆ZF1 and the relation of y and
α: “y = Vα” is ΠZF1 . We let
xy denote the set of all functions from the set x to y. It is often
customary to deviate from the practice when x = ω and we are considering, e.g. , ωω or ωX as
spaces and then we shall write ωω or Xω.
It is useful to fix a recursive enumeration 〈τi | i < ω〉 of Seq =df <ωω so that:
(i)τ0 = (), τ1 = (0); (ii) i ≥ |τi| (=df lh(τi)); (iii) τi ⊂ τj −→ i < j.
(We may similarly define recursive enumerating sequences 〈τki | i < ω〉 for k(<ωω).)
The Kleene-Brouwer ordering is defined as follows: for s, t ∈ <ωOn put
s <KB t↔ s ⊃ t ∨ (s(i) < t(i) where i ∈ ω is least with s(i) 6= t(i).
Finally recall that a set B ⊆ R is Π1n if it can be defined in Z2 with
x ∈ B ↔ ∃f1∀f2 · · ·Qfn∀kR(k,−−−→fi  k, x  k) with R ∈ Σ01
with the fi ∈ NN and k ∈ N. (Z2 is a formalisation of second order number theory, or analysis,
see [28].) A set is Π1n(a) for some a ∈ R if the parameter a is allowed into the above defining
Σ01 relation R. The classΠ
1
n is the union over a of the classes Π
1
n(a). As the typeface indicates,
a boldface point class indicates that, in general, real parameters are present in the definition of a
member if that class. A lightface point class such as Σ11 (also called lightfaced analytic), or Π
1
n,
is one which involves no such parameters. As is usual in set theory, we make little distinction
between R and ωω, or even P(ω) on occasion.
2 Inner Models, Elementary Embeddings, and Covering Lemmas
Go¨del constructed an inner model of V (here the hierarchy of wellfounded sets WF =
⋃
α∈On Vα)
by taking a “definable power set” operation x −→ Def(x) where x is shorthand for the first or-
der structure 〈x,∈〉 = 〈x,∈x × x〉. By the parsimonious nature of the Def function Go¨del
showed that the sets so constructed were very regular, that they appeared in a definable order
(thus a global axiom of choice was verified to hold in L) and that few subsets of any cardinal
were admitted; the last justifies the GCH, the generalised continuum hypothesis as holding in L.
The Def function can be augmented as a relativised definability operation x −→ DefA(x)
using definability over 〈x,A x,∈x × x〉 in the wider L∈˙,A˙ language; this gives us the ability
to construct both from the ordinals as well as using information from the predicate A. These




1 terms and hence are absolute. Given a
model W (thus given by some class term) we define the relativisation of a formula ϕ (or a
theory T ) denoted by ϕW (or TW respectively), to be the formula ϕ with all quantifiers ∀vi, ∃vj
replaced by ∀vi ∈ W, ∃vj ∈ W (respectively the same for all formulae in T ). We think of this
as expressing that the formula ϕ (or theory T ) holds in W .
We let “V = L” abbreviate the statement that every set is constructible, or more formally:
∀x∃α(x ∈ Lα). That (V = L)L was shown by Go¨del ([6]), as well as (AC)L, (GCH)L thereby
establishing: Con(ZF) =⇒ Con(ZFC + GCH). Why should V = L? As this is a hierarchy of
sets constructed by syntactico-semantical means, and not responding to any particular intuitions
about set existence, most set-theorists do not believe V = L (but see the discussion in [9]).
We shall see good reasons for asking whether there are other inner models, some associated
with the notions of elementary embeddings. We first define our terms.
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Definition 2.1 (Inner Model of ZF) IM(M)↔ Trans(M) ∧On ⊆M ∧ (ZF)M .
In the above we are assuming that M is given by some term of the language. The notion of
being an inner model of ZF actually has a first order formalisation: it is well known (see Jech
[8]) that
ZF ` IM(M)↔ ∀u ⊆M∃v ⊇ u(Trans(v) ∧Def(〈v,∈〉) ⊆M).
The notion of an inner model of ZFC is simply the above with AC added at the relevant points.
We single out the following beautiful theorem as the motivation for this account:
Theorem 2.2 (ZF) The following are equivalent:
a) ∃j : L −→e L.
b) ∃γ(ω2 ≤ γ ∈ SingCard∧(γ /∈ SingCard)L);
c) Det(Π11)
Here a) expresses that there is a truth-preserving map betweenL and itself (see the Definition
2.3 below) which is non-trivial: that is, it is not the identity map. This is actually a culminative
theorem established over several years: a)↔b) Jensen [3]; a)→ c) Martin [17]; c)→ a) Martin-
Harrington [7]. Part a) of the above theorem, is sometimes stated as: “0# exists”. For the c)
→ a) direction, Martin actually showed that the determinacy of games at the third level of the
difference hierarchy of analytic sets, proved the existence of 0#. This was then reduced by
Harrington to a single analytic in the work cited. For an elegant proof of the Harrington result
see [24].
One should consider the overall form of this theorem, even if it is anachronistically stated, it
is a deep result: it takes concepts that a priori have no connection with each other, but by deep
analysis are shown to be equivalent. The first, a), involves an elementary embedding of L to
itself.
Much large cardinal theory is about which ultrafilters can or do exist on (large) sets; in
particular when those large sets are the power set of some cardinal of an inner model, then there
is usually an equivalent formulation in terms of elementary embeddings, as defined below, of
that inner model such as stated at a).
It is often stated that “0# exists” is the first large cardinal axiom, in that it transcends Go¨del’s
L in a drastic fashion: such embeddings cannot be added by Cohen style forcing arguments, and
so can never be established by using ‘small large’ cardinals where the latter are those consistent
with with universe being L itself (such as inaccessible, weakly compact, or ineffable cardinals
etc.). Indeed from properties of 0#, one can show that the L becomes a very thin inner model of
V , and in some way becomes very similar to the class of ordinals alone.
The second clause b), is the negation of a form of the so-called Covering Lemma due to
Jensen. What is being negated is the assertion that all singular cardinals are seen by L to be
singular: whilst Lmay have many ‘cardinals’ that it does not see, or have, functions for mapping
them to smaller ordinals, functions that may exist in V , the assertion is that, nevertheless, L can
recognise the singularity of any singular cardinal of V . It must then possess functions cofinal in
these cardinals. If this failed for just one singular cardinal, then 0# would exist. The Covering
Lemma (which has stronger forms with more ramifications - see below) then asserts that the
cardinality and cofinality structure of V is reflected inwardly to some extent into that of L. If
a) holds however, this picture entirely collapses. The final clause c) is then at first glance quite
extraordinary: we are asked to believe that the determinacy of coanalytic games, thus something
right down at the bottom of the ramified hierarchy of sets, has a global effect: that it engenders an
elementary embedding j : L −→e L. It seems to have nothing to do with the other two clauses.
9It is one of the triumphs of the California school of set theory in the 1980’s that this picture
relating large cardinals and determinacy for the projective pointclasses, and on to sets in L(R)
came fully into focus, and was conclusively analysed. The equivalences in the theorem thus
also show that determinacy is not some arcane curiosity in the set theorists’ Wunderkammer, but
holds a central role in our current understanding of what the subject is about.
We explore the background to Jensen’s a)↔b). Again we have to define some terms:
Definition 2.3 Let M,N be inner models of ZF, j : M −→ N is an elementary embedding if
the function j takes elements x ∈ M to elements j(x) ∈ N in a ‘truth preserving way’: for any
formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) and any ~x = x0, . . . , xn−1 ∈M, then
ϕ(~x)M ↔ ϕ(−→j(x))N .
In this case we write: j : M −→e N . (We shall always assume that j 6= id, and shall
write cp(j) for the critical point: the least ordinal α so that j(α) > α, if it exists.)
(ii) If the above holds, but with the formulae restricted to a certain class, eg. the Σk formulae,
then we write j : M −→Σk N .
In the above scheme, we have assumed that the models M,N satisfy IM(M), IM(N)
above and are given by terms of our basic set theoretical language, and the same holds true
for j. Our embeddings in this paper will all have critical points in the ordinals. It is an easy
consequence of the ZF axioms (using the definition of the rank function, the Vα hierarchy, and
Replacement) that if j : M −→Σ1 N , then by a (meta-theoretic) induction on k we may prove
j : M −→Σk N for any k ∈ ω.
If ∃j : L −→e L then we may define a derived measure U = Uj on κ = cp(j) as follows:
we set
X ∈ Uj ↔ X ∈ P(κ)L ∧ κ ∈ j(X).
Then Uj is a normal measure ([10],p 52) on P(κ)L. Suppose we have j : M −→e N ;
cp(j) = κ, define U = Uj . Then we construct an ultrapower defining:
|Ult(M,U)| = {[f ]∼ : f ∈ κM ∩M}
where
f ∼ g ↔ {α | f(α) = g(α)} ∈ U
and on which we can define a pseudo-∈ relation E:
fEg ↔ {α | f(α) ∈ g(α)} ∈ U.
Because of where Uj comes from, we are guaranteed E is wellfounded on Ult(M,U); we
may define by recursion along E the Mostowski-Shepherdson transitivising collapse isomor-
phism pi : (Ult(M,Uj), E) −→ (N,∈) with N transitive, and we have, with k(pi([f ])) =
j(f)(κ):
j : (M,∈)
pi : ((Ult(M,Uj), E)) ∼= (N,∈)
(N,∈)
k
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We can, and often do, have (M,∈) = (V,∈). Also starting from any κ-complete U on
P(κ)V , (for an uncountable regular κ), then we can define Ult(V,U) and we may prove outright
that the E relation on Ult(V,U) will be wellfounded. In general for wellfounded cases we may
then define the map pi as above.
Taking these facts together then:
Theorem 2.4 (ZFC) Let κ > ω. The following are equivalent:
(a) There is a κ-complete non-principle ultrafilter on P(κ).
(b) ∃j : V −→e M with cp(j) = κ.
Scott took the construction of an ultrapower from model theory and used it to prove the first
theorem demonstrating that a ‘large cardinal’ was incompatible with V = L.
Theorem 2.5 (Scott [27]) (ZF) ∃κ(κ a measurable cardinal) =⇒ V 6= L.
Proof: If V = L, let κ be the least such measurable cardinal (MC), form the ultrapower and
so the embedding above. Then from j : V −→e N , and elementarity we have: (V = L)V −→
(V = L)N ; so as Trans(N), N = L. However “κ is the least MC” implies that (“j(κ) is the
least MC”)N . However N = V ∧ j(κ) > κ! Q.E.D.
The assumption of this theorem implies ∃j : V −→e M , but again by Go¨del’s results on
the absoluteness of the L-construction, LM = L, so j  L : L −→e L. Note that no first
order formula ϕ(v0) can differentiate between κ and j(κ): ϕ(κ)L ↔ ϕ(j(κ))L. Moreover both
ordinals are inaccessible cardinals in the sense of L.
So we investigate the consequences of this embedding from L to L and shall discover
that such indiscernibility of these critical points in fact characterises such embeddings. Kunen
showed ([14]) that if ∃j : L −→e L, then a number of consequences follow:
(i) Then there is such a j: L −→e L with cp(j) < ω1. Moreover defining U0 from such a
j with critical point κ0 least, we are guaranteed wellfoundedness of iterated ultrapowers: that
is we may define j01 : L −→e L by taking the ultrapower of L by U0; define U1 on P(κ1)L
where κ1 =df j01(κ0), and then Ult(L,U1) will also be wellfounded. We then may transitivise
it, and obtain L again. We thus have an embedding map j12 : L −→e L with critical point κ1;
we then define κ2 = j12(κ1) and U1 on P(κ2)L. The process may be iterated without breaking
down, forming a directed system 〈〈Nα〉, jαβ, κa, Uα〉α≤β∈On with (in this case) all Nα = L
and elementary maps into direct limits at limit stages λ, and the κα forming a class C of L-
inaccessibles, which is closed and unbounded below any uncountable cardinal.
(ii) The iteration points of such ultrapowers enjoy full-blooded indiscernibility properties in
L if ϕ(v0, . . . , vn) is any formula of L and ~γ ,~δ any two ascending sequences from [C]n+1 then
(ϕ(~γ)↔ ϕ(~δ))L.
Definition 2.6 (The 0#-mouse) Let jαβ etc. be as above. Let
M0 = 〈Lκ+L0 ,∈, U0〉.
This structure is called the “0#-mouse” which itself has iterated ultrapowers using maps that
are the restrictions of the
jαβ Mα : Mα −→e Mβ where Mα = 〈Lκ+Lα ,∈, Uα〉 etc.
Remark 2.7 The viewpoint is shifted to that of the mouse (M0) generating the model (in this
caseL). All of this is a paradigm for generalised constructible inner modelsK - the core models.
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By these means we argue for
Theorem 2.8 (ZF) If ∃j : L −→e L then ∀γ > ω((γ ∈ Card) −→ (γ Inacc)L).
Proof: The above implies that C ∩γ is unbounded below γ. However C is closed, so γ ∈ C.
Each γ ∈ C is inaccessible in L. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2.9 (Jensen)(ZF) Suppose γ ∈ SingCard, γ ≥ ω2 but (γ ∈ Reg)L. Then ∃j : L −→e
L, with j 6= id; that is “0# exists.”
Proof: Suppose ¬∃j : L −→e L, but γ is chosen least with γ ∈ SingCard but (γ ∈ Reg)L.
Without loss of interest, we shall assume that (i) cf(γ) > ω (ii) δ < γ −→ δω < γ. Let
τ = cf(γ). By assumption then τ < γ and so we may choose X0 ⊆ γ with |X0| = τ but X0
unbounded in γ. By (ii) we’ll assume also that for some X ⊃ X0 we have (a) γ ∈ X ≺ Lγ+L
(b) ωX ⊆ X (c) |X| = τω < γ.
Let pi : 〈X,∈〉 −→ 〈M,∈〉 = 〈Lδ,∈〉 be the collapsing isomorphism with pi(γ) = δ say.
Then we have:
(1) cf(δ) = τ also, with |δ| = |M | = |X| < γ.
Suppose we had P(δ)M = P(δ)L. Then we could define a measure derived from pi−1 in the
usual manner: let α = crit(pi−1) and define U by
Z ∈ U ⇐⇒ Z ∈ P(δ)M ∧ α ∈ pi−1(X).
Then U would be a countably complete ultrafilter on P(δ)L (that is why we chose ωX ⊆ X as
this implies ωM ⊆ M ), and this in turn implies that Ult(L,U) is wellfounded. However that
implies ∃j : L −→e L.
(X,∈) ∼= (Lδ,∈) ⊆ (L,∈)
(Lγ+ ,∈) ⊆ (L,∈) ∼= (Ult(L,U), E)
id
pi−1 j ⊃ pi−1
Hence we must have: P(δ)M ( P(δ)L. So:
(2) ∃β ≥ δ(Def(Lβ) ∩ P(δ)) * Lδ.
Choose β least so that (2) holds. By so-called fine structural methods Jensen showed how
there is a superstructure Lη for some η > γ+L and a sufficiently elementary map p˜i ⊃ pi−1,
p˜i : Lβ −→ Lη, and because there is a ‘new’ subset of δ definable over Lβ there must also be
a ‘new’ subset of γ = pi−1(δ) that is not in Lη. However this is absurd as by L’s construction
(P(γ) ⊂ Lγ+)L. Q.E.D.
Remark 2.10 The assumptions (i) and (ii) can be dropped, but not without some difficulty, in
particular when cf(γ) = ω; however the format of the argument remains roughly the same.
Theorem 2.11 ((Jensen - the full L-Covering Lemma) (ZF+¬0#))
For any X ⊆ On, if |X| > ω then there exists Y ∈ L with (a) |Y | = |X| and (b) Y ⊇ X .
The above result Theorem 2.9 is then a corollary of this. As are:
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Corollary 2.12 (ZF+¬0# exists) (a) Let (τ ∈ Reg)L with τ ≥ ω2, then cf(τ) = |τ |.
(b) Let τ ∈ SingCard. Then τ+ = τ+L.
Remark 2.13 Part (b) of the last Corollary above is sometimes called WCL the Weak Covering
Lemma. The reason is that for other inner modelsM we may have WCL(M) provable (obtained
by replacingL byM in the Corollary’s statements) whilst the full CL(M) is not. There is a result
of Mitchell that shows that if there are sufficiently many measurable cardinals in an inner model,
there may be many so-called Prikry-sequences (generic for Prikry forcings associated with the
measurables) in V that must mess up the full Covering Lemma.
Generalizations
If 0# = M0 exists as above, perhaps there is no non-trivial j : L[0#] −→e L[0#] and then
we have a CL(L[0#])? This is indeed the case; however if this new assumption fails then we
have “(0#)#”. We then get a theorem along the lines of a new Covering Lemma in the form of
CL(L[0#]) which holds iff ¬j : L[0#] −→e L[0#]. (0#)# is again a countable object and we
can repeat this process. After we have done this uncountably often our #-like mouse objects are
no longer countable and we have to resort to uncountable mice M .
Instead of toiling inductively through seas of such objects, Dodd & Jensen first proved the
following:
Theorem 2.14 (Dodd-Jensen [4]) (ZF) There is an inner model KDJ, so that if there is no inner
model with a measurable cardinal, then (a) there is no non-trivial embedding j;KDJ −→e KDJ
and (b) CL(KDJ).
This was the first core model to go beyond L (if one discounts the models L[0#] etc).
Theorem 2.15 (Steel [30]) (ZFC) If there is no inner model for a Woodin cardinal, then there is
a model KSteel, which is again rigid, and over which WCL(KSteel) holds.
Perhaps there is some ultimate model which, although not L, is an inner model L[E] say,
which is the “core” of V , with E coding up all possible ‘measures’ or means of generating em-
beddings of models, and hopefully one has say WCL(L[E])? Maybe, but to date the following
‘inner model program’ has worked on the following inductive template: assume you have built
core models KΓ
′
for any strictly weaker large cardinal assumption Γ′ than “There is an inner
model with a Large Cardinal Γ”. Now assume there is no inner model for such a cardinal as
Γ and build KΓ, which, you should show, still under this assumption, is rigid and over which
WCL(KΓ) holds. Finally, if the latter fails you have (by contraposition) an inner model with
a Γ-cardinal. Continue. This programmatic approach to filling out V with wider and thicker
inner models depending on the strength of the large cardinals existing in inner models of V , has
become known as the “Inner Model program”. Currently, however, the programme is stuck at
the level roughly of Γ a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals.
Further remarks:
Theorem 2.16 (Magidor, [16]) (ZF) Assume ¬0#. Then if X ⊆ On is uncountable and closed
under the primitive recursive set functions, then X =
⋃
n<ω Yn with each Yn ∈ L.
This is thus a decomposition rather than a covering theorem, but its proof is essentially
(but perhaps surprisingly) a variant on Jensen’s argument. The primitive recursive set functions
mentioned are a mild collection of absolute functions on sets generalizing those on numbers, cf
[2].
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For many constructions, ordinal combinatorial properties up to a successor cardinal γ+ are
needed. The significance of the WCL over a model M say is that γ+ = γ+M for certain cardi-
nals of V (including the singular cardinals). The requisite ordinal combinatorial property may
be established in the inner model M . Providing that the property is then sufficiently simple that
it is absolute to V , we then have that that the combinatorial property is valid in V as well and
is available for us for that original construction. The Weak Covering Lemma (under the rigidity
assumption as always) has thus delivered for us a piece of absolute knowledge about V : one
such combinatorial principle is called:
γ : There is 〈Cα | α ∈ Sing∩γ+〉 with
(i) Cα ⊆ α is closed; it is unbounded in α, if cf(α) > ω;
(ii) otp(Cα) < α;
(iii) β ∈ Cα −→ Cβ = β ∩ Cα.
Such a sequence can be thought of as a uniformly presented sequence of witnesses to the
singularity of ordinals below γ+, which cohere or glue together nicely as expressed in (iii). This
is useful for inductive constrictions up to γ+, and in particular for singular γ. Since the properties
(i)-(iii) are absolute betweenM and V , if such can be constructed inM and γ+ = γ+M we have
such a good sequence in V .
Remark 2.17 Jensen first established γ for all γ ∈ Card, in L. This was then established
in the core models over the years as they were developed (in KDJ by the author, in KSteel by
Schimmerling-Zeman [26], and with other results by other set theorists for intermediate models
which we have not defined, see also [25] for an overview.) As intimated, principles such as
γ can be seen as identifying very uniform singularising functions for singular ordinals. Certain
large cardinals have an effect of implying the non-existence of certain such sequences in V . Other
forcing axioms outright contradict the existence of any γ sequences at all. The study of such
principles and their various weakenings has told us a lot about the interrelationship between large
cardinals and inner models. The reference [25] gives an outline of which inner models can admit
such sequences: it was a fundamental question which these authors solved as to which canonical
inner models could in the end support such sequences: since it was known that large cardinals
contradicted -principles, it was germane to find precisely where these principles broke down.
Remark 2.18 It is possible to establish the “correct successor cardinal” computation for certain
classes of regular limit cardinals γ other than singulars alone: for γ weakly compact in V , (Jensen
originally forL); γ Ramsey (Mitchell [21] originally forKDJ, later in [22] forKSteel); γ Jonsson
(Welch [31] forKSteel) again thereby showing that for cardinals in these classes, their successors
in V also enjoy certain combinatorial properties. However for inaccessibles in general this will
fail.
3 Determinacy: The Martin-Harrington Theorem
We have mentioned extremely briefly the history of determinacy; a complete source for this ma-
terial is Moschovakis [23]. We have stated that the regularity properties hold for the projective
sets, if all such sets are determined. In this section we define the basic terms relating to determi-
nacy, and outline the route leading from large cardinals to projective determinacy. In particular
we demonstrate the key concepts of weakly homogeneous tree and the (weakly) homogeneously
Suslin property for sets of reals (Defs. 3.11 and 3.14 below). It is the descriptive set-theoretical
analysis and representation of sets via trees, that goes back implicitly to Suslin for Σ11-sets, and
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for trees with special measures on them, that enable these theorems. The large cardinals enter
the picture, as they are needed to provide the special measurability properties on the trees to
make the analysis work. However it was then seen later, that the determinacy of sets which be-
came thus provable, in turned proved ‘reversals’, in the form of demonstrations of the existence
of inner models of the large cardinals which had been needed to prove the determinacy in the
first place. (Notice that determinacy statements alone, being as they are, statements about the
existence of strategies, which are essentially themselves reals, and so statements about elements
of Vω+1, cannot prove that large cardinals actually exist in V - as the latter statements are about,
say, some large Vκ+1, but it can, and does, prove the existence of inner models of those large
cardinals.) The relationship between the determinacy of co-analytic sets and embeddings of L
was thus the first evidence of a very rich picture that subsequently emerged. What was at first
dark and mysterious about determinacy became fully understood through this analysis. Whatever
one’s position on the concept of large cardinals or strong axioms of infinity, we cannot under-
stand determinacy of the projective sets, say, without it. The ‘reversals’ alluded to above prove
this. Even if one dislikes arguments from ‘extrinsic evidence’ to the existence of large cardinals
as actual sets, there is no denying their explanatory, and so instrumental, power. Probably for
many set theorists that instrumental power alone is a considerable motive for their adoption. Ex-
planatory power is a strong conceptual motivator in other areas of mathematics: mathematicians
would have no hesitation in embedding what they were doing in some larger or new kind of
space, if it led to understanding. If we regard set theory purely as a mathematical activity, for a
moment imagining it shorn of any foundational pretensions, then adoption of such axioms might
well be be considered unexceptionable.
Another significant definability property one may ask for is Uniformization. Suppose Γ,H
are two pointclasses of sets of reals. We say that Unif(Γ,H) holds if whenever Q ∈ Γ∩P(kR×
R) (k < ω) then there is P ⊆ Q, P ∈ H and
∀x[∃yQ(y, x) =⇒ ∃!yP (y, x)]
(P thus acts as a function uniformising the relationQ by choosing a unique element in the relation
for each x for which such is possible.) Classically one had (The Novikoff-Kondo-Addison The-
orem) Unif(Π11,Π
1
1). We let PU (Projective Uniformisation) abbreviate the statement that every
projective relation can be projectively uniformised. It is fundamental outcome of Moschovakis’s
analysis of the scale property in the projective hierarchy, that projective determinacy implies the
existence of projectively definable scales, and thence that PU holds (again cf [23]).
At a first encounter it seems an unusual position to take, to posit winning strategies for infi-
nite games as plausible set-theoretical axioms. Why should such strategies even exist? However
we see now that the regularity properties of sets is actually equivalent to determinacy, i.e. to the
existence of such strategies, for all sets definable from R and the ordinals (cf Theorem 1.9).
The regularity properties have been the bread and butter of analysts for decades and are innately
uncontroversial. That the early analysts were unable to establish these properties beyond the
co-analytic, was indeed because they were trammelled by working, albeit implicitly, only with
ZFC-provable tools.
Games.
Definition 3.1 For A ⊆ ωω (or more generally Xω) the infinite perfect information game GA is
defined between two players I, II, alternately playing elements ni,mi ∈ X:
I n0 n1 n2 · · · nk · · ·
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II m0 m1 · · · mk · · ·
together construed as constructing x = (n0,m0, . . . , nk,mk, . . .) ∈ Xω.
We say that I wins iff x ∈ A; otherwise II wins. Notions of strategy and winning strategy are
defined in the obvious fashion. Notice that for A ⊆ ωω a strategy σ for, e.g. I is a map from⋃
k
2kω −→ ω. Since there is a recursive bijection <ωω ↔ ω, we can think of σ as essentially
a subset of ω, or again, as a real number.
We speak of a topology of open and closed sets of a space Xω by letting a typical basic open
set to be a neighbourhood Ns where s ∈ SeqX is a finite sequence of elements of X:
Ns =df {x ∈ Xω | ∃k < ω(x  k = s}.
Notice this is suitable for talking about payoff sets in such games: if in the above A is an Ns
then essentially if I is to win, then he will have done so after |s| many rounds of the game
(where |s| is the length of the sequence s). An open set is then a countable union of basic open
neighbourhoods; a closed set is a complement of an open etc. When X = ω and an open set, U ,
is given as a union of basic open neighbourhoods defined by a recursively given set of sequences
numbers s coding elements of <ωω, then we say that U is semi-recursive, or Σ01. More generally
we speak of open sets and Σ01 sets in parameter codes which are themselves subsets of ω or
again real numbers. If A is an open set in this topology, then I will win by essentially winning at
some finite stage of the game; for II to win, then she must be vigilant to the end, to play into the
complementary closed set.
The basic theorem here is:
Theorem 3.2 (Gale-Stewart) (ZF) Let A ⊆ Xω be an open set. Then GA is determined, that is
one of the players has a winning strategy.
Proof: Note that if I wins it is because he has manœuvred the play so that there is a finite
stage (n0,m0, . . . , nk) so that N(n0,m0, . . . , nk) ⊆ A. Essentially he has won by this stage as it
matters not what nl he plays for l > k. II however, playing into the closed set which is Xω\A
must be vigilant to the end if she is to win. Suppose then I has no winning strategy. Then for
every n0 II has a reply m0 so that I has no winning strategy in the game GA/(n0,m0) where
A/(n0,m0) =df {x ∈ A | x(0) = n0, x(1) = m0}. For, if there was an n0 so that I did
always have a winning strategy in this latter game for whichever m0 II played, σ(m0) say, then
this would amount to a winning strategy for him in GA: first play n0, wait for m0 and then use
σ(m0). Thus given n0 II should playm0 so that I has no such strategy. However if she continues
in this way, this is a winning strategy for II: always respond so that I has no winning strategy
from that point on. The resulting play x cannot be in A. Q.E.D.
The maxim here is that we can always in ZFC, prove Det(Open) for any space Xω and so
by taking complements Det(Closed) too. (AC is needed only to wellorder X if need be.) Many
proofs of determinacy of complicated sets in ωω or Xω, involve reducing the game to a closed
game in some larger space Y ω. The latter are determined by the Gale-Stewart theorem. The
difficulty arises in showing that the player with the winning strategy for the open set on the space
Y ω also has one for the related, but much more, complicated set in Xω.
Definition 3.3 (i) A tree T on ω ×X (for X 6= ∅) is a set of sequences in⋃k kω × kX where
if (σ, u) and k ≤ |σ| = |u| then (σ  k, u  k) ∈ T . Similarly defines trees on nω ×X .
(ii) For such a tree T we set
Tσ =df {u | (σ, u) ∈ T} ; T⊆σ =df
⋃
k≤|σ|
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Definition 3.4 For T a tree:
(i) [T ] =df {(x, f) | ∀k(x  k, f  k) ∈ T} - is the set of branches through T .
(ii) p [T ] =df {x ∈ ωω(or k(ωω)) | ∃f(x, f) ∈ [T ]} - the projection of T .
(iii) A setA ⊆ k(ωω) is κ-Suslin (for κ ≥ ω, κ ∈ Card) ifA = p[T ] for some tree on ω×κ.
Clearly a tree is wellfounded (under ⊇) if [T ] = ∅. For a C ⊆ ω × X a closed set, there
is a tree T on ω × X with C = [T ]. In particular for X = ω. If C has a recursively open




If A ⊆ ωω is Σ11 then A = p[T ] for a tree on ω × ω - thus such sets are projections of
closed sets, and conforms to the idea that x ∈ A ↔ ∃y ∈ ωω(x, y) ∈ [T ]. This classical
result (due to Suslin) is sometimes stated that analytic ( = Σ11) sets are “ω-Suslin”. Many of the
classical properties of analytic sets as studied by analysts can be attributed to this (and similar)
representations.
Given this last fact, we can represent Π11 sets, being complements of Σ
1
1’s, as those sets
where the tree T for the complement is wellfounded. We may thus define rank functions for
such trees, by finding functions that map the nodes into the ordinals in a tree-order preserving
way. We do this next.
Let then A ∈ Π11 be a (lightface) co-analytic set. Then by the above discussion there is a
recursive tree T (meaning there is a recursive set of sequence numbers) on ω × ω with:
∀x(x ∈ A↔ Tx is wellfounded).
Tx being countable, we have that rk(Tx) < ω1. Consequently:
x ∈ A⇔ ∃g(g : Tx −→ ω1 in an order preserving way).
That is we may define a tree Tˆ on ω × ω1 as follows:
Tˆ = {(τ, u) | ∀i, j < |τ | : τi ⊃ τj ∧ (τ  |τi|, τi) ∈ T −→ u(i) < u(j)}.
Then one can see that
x ∈ A↔ ∃g ∈ ωω1((x, g) ∈ [Tˆ ])↔ x ∈ p[Tˆ ].
The above reasoning thus shows that any Π11 set A is ω1-Suslin. Further:
(i) Tˆ ∈ L, and by the absoluteness of well founded relations on ω between ZF−-models
containing all countable ordinals [Tˆ ] 6= ∅↔ ([Tˆ ] 6= ∅)L.
(ii) If the underlying set is a Π11(a) set for some real parameter a then Tˆ ∈ L[a].
Now the argument can be stepped up to Σ12 sets: suppose x ∈ B ↔ ∃y(x, y) ∈ A (we write
‘B = pA’) with A ∈ Π11 and hence there is a tree TˆA on (ω × ω)× ω1 with
(x, y) ∈ A↔ ∃g ∈ ωω1
(
((x, y), g) ∈ [T̂A]
)
.
However there is a ∆ZF0 definable bijection ω× (ω×ω1)↔ (ω × ω)× ω1 thus re-defining
the tree T̂A as T but on different sequences, so that for any x, y we have
(x, y) ∈ p[T̂A]↔ ∃g ∈ ωω1
(
((x, y), g) ∈ [T̂A]
)↔ ∃g ∈ ωω1((x, (y, g)) ∈ [T ]).
However now we again use a ∆ZF0 bijection ω × ω1 ↔ ω1to recast T as a tree Ton ω1 alone,
then:
x ∈ B ↔ x ∈ pA↔ x ∈ p[T ].
We have:
Theorem 3.5 (Shoenfield) (ZF) Any Σ12 set is ω1-Suslin, as a projection of a tree T ∈ L.
17
Corollary 3.6 (ZF) Let B be any Σ12 relation. The ∃xB(x) ↔ (∃xB(x))L. In particular Σ12
sentences are absolute between L and the universe V . Moreover if A ⊆ N is Σ12 then A ∈ L.
Theorem 3.7 (Levy) (ZF) There is an ordinal σ1 < ωL1 such that (Lσ1 ,∈) ≺Σ1 (V,∈).
Proof: Let A be a Σ1 sentence in L true in V . By Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, the following holds:
“There is a countable wellfounded transitive model (M,∈) with (A)M”.
The latter can be expressed as a Σ12 assertion about a real number x (coding such an (M,∈)). By
the last corollary there is such an x, and Mx ∈ LωL1 . By the upward persistence of Σ1 sentences
(A)Mx =⇒ (A)L. Hence LωL1 ≺Σ1 V . Q.E.D.
We sometimes wish to be more specific about the tree for Π11 and for this we use the Kleene-
Brouwer ordering: <KB is a linear ordering, and it restricts to linear orderings on <ωκ for cardi-
nals κ ≥ ω. One may check:
If T is a tree on κ then T is wellfounded iff T is wellordered by <KB. In particular we have
for a Π11 set A that there is a tree T on ω × ω so that
x ∈ A↔ Tx is wellfounded ↔ Tx is wellordered by <KB .
For a tree T on ω×κ we then have a linear ordering <x corresponding to the KB ordering of Tx
with the following definition and properties:
i <x j ←→df (τi, τj /∈ Tx ∧ i < j) ∨ (τi /∈ Tx ∧ τj ∈ Tx) ∨ (τi, τj ∈ Tx ∧ τi <KB τj).
In fact <x is the union of orderings given by initial segments of x: for τ ∈ <ωω define





(ii) Define T ∗A on ω × κ by (τ, u) ∈ T ∗A ←→df ∀i, j < |τ |(i <τ j ↔ u(i) < u(j)). Then
x ∈ A↔ ∃g ∈ ωκ((x, g) ∈ [T ∗A]).
In the above κ ≥ ω may be any cardinal of course. After the basic definitions were introduced
Det(Σ03) (M. Davies [1]) was the extent of provable determinacy (indeed provable within Z2).
Remarkably H. Friedman ([5]) showed that for Borel Determinacy roughly, order type α itera-
tions of the power set operation (together with some Replacement) would be needed to establish
Det(Σ0α), thus establishing that Z 6 `Det(∆11). This phenomenon would start at Σ04. Paris then
showed (using ZFC) Det(Σ04) but there matters languished until:
Theorem 3.8 (Martin [20]) (ZF) Det(Borel) for Borel subsets of ωω.
Theorem 3.9 (Martin-Harrington) (ZF) ∃j : L −→e L, j 6= id⇐⇒ Det(Π11).
Proof: (−→) (Martin) We assume the left hand side, and then by the work of Silver, Kunen,
we have a c.u.b. set C ⊆ ω1 of indiscernibles for (L,∈).
Let A ∈ Π11. The usual game GA involves integer moves but has a complicated payoff
set. We replace the space ωω with a larger one Xω for some X to be defined, and relate A to
some closed A∗ ⊆ Xω. By the Gale-Stewart theorem, this is determined. We have to show that
winning strategies in GA∗ can be translated to winning strategies for the same player in GA.
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Definition 3.10 GA∗ is defined between two players I, II playing as follows:
I (n0, ξ0) (n1, ξ1) (n2, ξ2) · · · (nk, ξk) · · ·
II m0 m1 · · · mk · · ·
together constructing
x = ((n0, ξ0),m0, (n1, ξ1),m1, (n2, ξ2),m2, · · · (nk, ξk), , . . .).
The Rules are that ni,mi ∈ ω, ξi ∈ ω1. We think of the ξi as laying out a function
g : ω −→ ω1 with g(i) = ξi, and the integers yielding x = (n0,m0, n1, . . . )
Winning Conditions: I wins iff (x, g) ∈ T ∗A.
Then g witnesses that Tx is wellfounded, by giving an order preserving map from <x into ω1.
Note that the game is closed in the sense that if I loses he does so at some finite stage (by mess-
ing up his ordering, which cannot be redeemed at a later stage). Equivalently, II is playing into
an open set and if she wins, does so at a finite round. Note that T ∗A is defined in L, and so by the
Gale-Stewart theorem, is determined in L.
Claim: If σ∗ is a winning strategy for I (respectively II) in GA∗ in L, then there is a winning
strategy for I (respectively II) in GA.
Proof of Claim. If σ∗ is a winning strategy for I he can use it to play in GA by suppressing
the ordinal moves, and clearly wins (both in L and V ). Suppose then σ∗ ∈ L is, in L, a winning
strategy for II.
Idea: II simulates a run of GA∗ by using indiscernibles from C0 =df C ∩ ω1 as ‘typical’
ordinal moves for I . She defines a strategy σ :
⋃
n
2n+1ω −→ ω as follows; fix n < ω and
consider the formula ϕ(ω1, T ∗, σ∗, τ, ~ξ,m) which defines a term t(ω1, T ∗, σ∗, τ, ~ξ) = m:
~ξ ∈ n+1ω1 ∧ σ∗(τ  n+ 1, ~ξ) ∈ T ∗ ∧ σ∗(τ, ~ξ) = m
As σ∗, T ∗ ∈ L the term t will have a fixed value m ∈ N for any ~ξ ∈ n+1C0 she chooses, since
the latter are indiscernibles for the formula ϕ. So she sets (in V where C0 lives):
σ(τ) = m = t(ω1, T
∗, σ∗, τ, ~ξ) for any ~ξ ∈ n+1C0.
Now argue that were x ∈ A even though II followed this strategy, then we’d have that there
is an order preserving embedding g : (ω,<x) −→ (C0, <) (as C0 is uncountable). However that
corresponds to a run of the game GA∗ (with ordinal moves delivered by g), where II has used σ∗,
which was supposed to be winning for her! Contradiction! Q.E.D.
It is an exercise to show that if a GA for A ⊆ ωω is determined, A is countable, or else
contains a perfect subset and hence is the size of the continuum. However in L there is an
uncountable Π11 set which has no perfect subset. Conclusion: Det(Π
1
1) is false in L and so
ZF0Det(Π11). In the above we constructed a winning strategy for II in V . However the state-
ment “∃σ[σis a winning strategy for II in GA]” is a strictly Σ13 statement, and such is not in
general absolute to L.
We should like to establish Det(Π1n) for other n > 1 but this requires considerably more
ingenuity. The key is to find representations of projective sets as projections of trees enjoying
so-called ‘homogenity properties’ which entail that there are measures (and more) on the trees.
This tree representation was implicit in the proofs of Det(Π11) of Martin and in Martin-Solovay
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[18] where such trees were used to analyse Π12 sets. However the notion was only made explicit
in Kechris [11]. For the rest of this article we shall work in ZFC unless otherwise stated.
Definition 3.11 (Homogeneous Trees and Sets) Let T be a tree on ω × X and κ > ω be a
cardinal.
(A) Then T is a κ-homogeneously Suslin tree iff ∃〈Uτ | τ ∈ Seq〉 where
(i) Each Uτ is a κ-complete measure on Tτ ;
(ii) For any τ ⊃ σ Uτ projects to Uσ: i.e. u ∈ Uσ ↔ {v ∈ Tτ : v  |σ| ∈ u} ∈ Uτ .
(iii) The Uτ form a countably complete tower: if σi ∈ Seq, Zi ∈ Uσi are such that i < j −→
σi ⊂ σj then there is a g ∈ ωX so that: ∀i(g  i ∈ Zi).
(B) We say A ⊆ ωω is κ-homogeneously Suslin if A = p[T ] for a κ-homogeneously Suslin tree
T.
Notice that one way to phrase (iii) is to say that if x ∈ p[T ] then 〈Uxi : i < ω〉 form
a countably complete tower. Although the notion had to be isolated in fact Martin had used
essentially the fact that if there exist a measurable cardinal κ then any analytic set is p[T ] for a
κ-homogenously Suslin tree on ω × κ.
Theorem 3.12 Suppose A is κ-homogeneously Suslin for some κ. Then GA is determined.
Proof: Suppose A = p[T ] with T κ-homogeneously Suslin on ω × λ (some λ ≥ κ.
Definition 3.13 GA∗ is defined between two players I, II playing as follows:
I (n0, ξ0) (n1, ξ1) (n2, ξ2) · · · (nk, ξk) · · ·
II m0 m1 · · · mk · · ·
together constructing
x = ((n0, ξ0),m0, (n1, ξ1),m1, (n2, ξ2),m2, · · ·).
Rules: ni,mi ∈ ω, ξi ∈ λ. Winning Conditions: as before I wins iff (x, g) ∈ [T ] where
g(i) = ξi.
Again this is a closed game, and so there is a winning strategy for one of the players in L[T ].
Now to show that if II has a winning strategy in GA if she has a winning strategy σ∗ in GA∗ , we
use the ω1-completeness of the measures rather than indiscernibility.
She defines a strategy σ :
⋃
n
2n+1ω −→ ω as follows; for n < ω and then for τ ∈
2n+1ω, u ∈n+1 λ, define σ(τ, u) = σ∗(τ(0), u(0), · · · , τ(2n), u(2n)) ∈ ω.
Define Zτ,k =df {u ∈ T (τ  n + 1) : σ(τ, u) = k}. Since Uτn+1 is a measure on
T (τ  n+ 1), by its ω1-completeness, for precisely one value of k is Zτ,k ∈ Uτn+1. So let that
value of k, k0 say, be the response given by the strategy:
σ(τ) = k0 where k0 is the unique value of k0 with Zτ,k0 ∈ Uτn+1.
Again we check that σ is a winning strategy for II in GA. If x is a result of a play with II using
σ, but nevertheless x ∈ A, then by (iii) in the definition of κ-homogeneously Suslin ∃g ∈ ωX
so that for every n g  n + 1 ∈ Zx2n+1,σ(x2n+1). This implies (x, g) ∈ [T ] and is then a los-
ing outcome of the game where II in fact uses σ∗, thus contradicting that the latter is a winning
strategy for II. Hence x ∈ A. Q.E.D.
Hence determinacy would follow if we could establish homogeneity properties for trees.
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Definition 3.14 A ⊆ ωω is weakly homogeneously Suslin if A = pB where B ⊆ (ωω)2 is
homogeneously Suslin.
In fact this is not the official definition of weakly homogeneously Suslin which defines
“weakly homogenous trees” and is in terms of towers of measures, but nevertheless has this
equivalence. These were also studied by Kechris [11] and Martin.
Weakly homogeneously Suslin sets (being the projections of weakly homogeneous trees) can
be thought of as generalisations of analytic sets and are of great interest in their own right: we
have seen that if there is a measurable cardinal, then Σ12 sets are weakly homogeneously Suslin.
Theorem 3.15 If a set A is weakly homogeneously Suslin, then it has the regularity properties
(Lebesgue measurability, the Baire and Perfect subset properties ...).
It thus has the consequences of being determined, without actually being so. Unfortunately
A being weakly homogeneously Suslin does not imply that it is homogeneously Suslin. However
one important feature is that they do have complements defined as projections of trees T˜ with
the latter definable from their weakly homogenously tree T :
Lemma 3.16 Let A be p[T ] with T weakly homogeneously Suslin. Then there is a tree T˜ with
ωω\A = p[T˜ ].
However on its own this is no help. The breakthrough was:
Theorem 3.17 (Martin-Steel [19]) Suppose that λ is a Woodin cardinal and T is a λ+ weakly
homogeneously Suslin tree. Then for γ < λ, the T˜ above is γ-homogeneously Suslin.
There is thus some trade off: the completeness of the measures drops. However we now
have:
Theorem 3.18 (Martin-Steel) Suppose λ0 is a Woodin cardinal, and κ > λ0 is measurable.
Then Det(Π12). Further if λn−1 < λn−2 < · · · < λ0 are n − 1 further Woodin cardinals, then
Det(Π1n+1). Thus:
ZFC + “there exist infinitely many Woodin cardinals” ` PD .
Proof: Let A ⊆ ωω be Π12. Then A is the complement of a Σ12 set on ωω which is itself the
projection of a Π11 set B ⊆ (ωω)2. B is κ-homogeneously Suslin for some homogeneously tree
T , as κ is measurable, and a fortiori is also λ+0 -homogeneously Suslin. By Theorem 3.18 we
have a γ-homogeneously Suslin tree T˜ projecting to A with γ-complete measures. By Theorem
3.12 we have GA is determined, and we are done. The last two sentences follow by repetition of
the argument. Q.E.D.
The exact consistency strength of the assumption above is slightly stronger, with the (⇐=)
being very involved:
Theorem 3.19 (Woodin)
Con(ZFC +“there exist infinitely many Woodin cardinals”)⇐⇒ Con(ZFC + ADL(R)).
The final conclusion of Theorem 3.18 yields the boundary of the provability of PD from
large cardinal axioms; this is not a relative consistency result, PD holds outright. Set forcing
can change the character of the universe locally, but, roughly speaking, does not destroy large
cardinal properties beyond the rank of the partial order. Consequently if V has a proper class of
Woodin cardinals, then PD is not only provable outright but is absolute into set forcing exten-
sions. Much more is possible:
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Theorem 3.20 (Woodin) Suppose there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals; then Th(L(R})
is absolute with respect to set forcing. Thus if V [G] is a set generic extension
(L(R))V ≡ (L(R))V [G].
The larger cardinals that we look at next will again all prove PD and in fact ADL(R) outright.
We have seemingly reached a particular stage beyond which these determinacy properties are
simply unavoidable.
4 Large Cardinals
Much large cardinal theory is about which ultrafilters can or do exist on (large) sets; in particular
when those large sets are the power set of some cardinal of an inner modelM (which might be V
itself), then there is usually an equivalent formulation in terms of elementary embeddings, of that
inner model M . In the past large cardinals, or the axioms asserting their existence, were often
claimed as justified by a variety of differing arguments. (An example being the paper of [29].)
Such arguments tended to give a somewhat patchwork view of large cardinals: some justified
“by analogy with ω”, others by reflection principles of one kind or another. Contemporary set
theory now tends to see large cardinals in a linear, indeed well founded, hierarchy of consistency
strength, but moreover as providing a lined up picture of embedding properties ordered by the
degree that the embedding “pulls in” to its range model, more, or less, of the Vα-hierarchy. There
is some over-simplification here, as pulling in some Vλ into a range modelM will be weaker than
ensuring that such an M has more closure properties, such as being closed under λ′-sequences
for a λ′ < λ. However the overall slogan holds true: the more closure properties the range model
enjoys, the stronger the embedding and the stronger the large cardinal needed to justify it. Again
the unificatory impulse which sees large cardinals as positioned within a somewhat continuous
spectrum of embeddability relations, can be said to lead to a greater understanding of possible
embedding phenomena. The very possibility of mathematically defining an embedding of L to L
immediately then impresses us with the need to study the whole such hierarchy: if the universe
of constructible sets can embed to itself then why not the modelKDJ? However if this occurred,
then there is an inner model with a measurable cardinal (see Theorem 2.14 above). In short, there
seem to be no lines to be drawn here.
Such embeddings are almost all expressible in terms of the existence of ultrafilters, or in
other words, measures (or sequences of such) on certain sets. We have seen that a measure U on
P(κ) in V yields an ultrapower (Ult(V,U), E) which is wellfounded and hence isomorphic to a
transitive inner model (M,∈) of ZFC. The following facts hold:
• Vκ+1 = (Vκ+1)M
• (j(κ) is measurable with measure j(U))M ;
• U /∈M and thus Vκ+2 6= (Vκ+2)M .
• κ may, or may not, be measurable in M because of the presence in M of some other
measure U ). (If κ was the least measurable of V then it cannot contain such a U , by the Scott
argument).
Thus given an elementary embedding j : V −→e M , the above shows precisely which
initial part of V can be expected to be in M in general, namely Vκ+1. The first generalisations of
this concept consider sequences of such measures concentrating on different subsets of the same
cardinal κ. (There are potentially then 22
κ
of those for a given measurable cardinal κ.) Beyond
that we start to ask for sets of higher rank to be in the range model, and this motivates the next
definition.
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Definition 4.1 A cardinal κ is α-strong if there is an embedding j : V −→e M with Va =
(Vα)
M , with cp(j) = κ, and j(κ) ≥ α.
Thus a measurable cardinal is κ+ 1 strong. The larger the α, the stronger the embedding, as
more of the initial V hierarchy is preserved by the identity map into the inner model M .
Definition 4.2 A cardinal κ is strong if it is α-strong for all α.
(Note the order of quantifiers: for every α there is an embedding j, depending on α ...) One
may wonder about the first order formalizability of the above notions in ZF. However just as
the first statement of the existence of a measure on P(κ) is equivalent to the existence of a class
embedding j (which we might formulate in ZFCj˙ ) it is possible to give an extender representa-
tion of such embeddings. Thus: for an α-strong embedding j we may find a generalisation of a
measure on P(κ) called an extender which we may think of as given by a sequence of measures
〈Ea : a ∈ [α]<ω〉 with each Ea itself a measure on P([κ]|a|).
Given an α-strong embedding j;V −→e N we define an α-extender at κ generalising what
we did for measures.
X ∈ Ea ↔df X ∈ P([κ]|a|) ∧ a ∈ j(X).
The sequence E = 〈Ea : a ∈ [α]<ω〉 then has satisfactory coherence properties, in fact enough
so that we can define an extender ultrapower (Ult(V, E), E) from it. In the situation described,
this ultrapower has a wellfounded E-relation, and is again isomorphic to some (M,∈) which
in general is not necessarily equal to (N,∈) but which can be elementarily embedded back into






It is possible to view the Ult(V, E) as a direct limit of the ‘ordinary’ ultrapowers by the
measures Ea. It is part of the flexibility of the approach that this is inessential though.
Having thus generalised the notion of measure ultrapower to extender ultrapower we can use
these to give us first order formulations of α-strong etc. A simplified statement is:
Lemma 4.3 Let α be a strong limit cardinal; then κ is α-strong iff there is an α-extender se-
quence E = 〈Ea : a ∈ [α]<ω〉 at κ, with Vκ+α ⊆ Ult(V, E) ∧ j(κ) > α.
The notion of κ being strong is then also first order (although involving a quantifier over
On). One may note the following easily proven fact: κ strong implies that Vκ ≺Σ2 V .
Definition 4.4 κ is superstrong if there is j : V −→e M with Vj(κ) ⊆M .
Note that α-strong only asked for Vα ⊆ M whilst j(κ) > α. This seemingly innocuous
extension is in fact a powerful strengthening. Again it has a first order formalisation. We proceed
to a definition of Woodin cardinal. First we define a strengthening of the concept of strong.
Definition 4.5 Let A ⊆ V . We say that κ is A-strong in V if for every α there are M, B ⊆ V
with IM(M) and an L∈˙,A˙ - elementary embedding
j : 〈V,A〉 −→e 〈M,B〉 such that cp(j) = κ, Vα ⊆M and Vα ∩A = Vα ∩B.
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This is not a first order formalisation, but now consider an inaccessible λ and relativise the
notion from V down to Vλ
Theorem 4.6 An inaccessible cardinal λ is called Woodin if for every A ⊆ Vλ there is a κ < λ
which is A-strong in Vλ.
There are many other equivalent formulations (cf. Kanamori [10] Sect 26.). A Woodin car-
dinal is necessarily Mahlo, but may fail to be weakly compact. It turned out that this is precisely
the right concept to analyse the various determinacy properties. Subsequently it turned out to be
also precisely the right concept to gauge a whole host of other set theoretical phenomena, and
thus it has become one of the central notions of modern set theory.
Lemma 4.7 (i) If κ is superstrong then it is a Woodin limit of Woodins.
(ii) If λ is Woodin then (“there are arbitrarily large strong cardinals”)Vλ .
A particular constellation of cardinals is also of interest for determinacy of infinite games
played with reals, rather than integers. The assertion “ADR” is that for everyA ⊆ ωR , the game
GA is determined, where in the game now, players play a complete real number at each round
instead of a single integer. The following conjecture emerged.
Conjecture ( The “ADR hypothesis”) The consistency strength of ADR is that of a cardinal
µ that is simultaneously a limit of infinitely many Woodins λn < λn+1 · · · < µ and of µ-strong
cardinals κn < λn < κn+1.
The hypothesis is also interesting since (given a mild strengthening of AD), the ADR -hypothesis
is equivalent to the assertion that every set of reals is Suslin. The following is another connection
between the worlds of large cardinals and determinacy of games.
Theorem 4.8 (Woodin (⇐), Neeman-Steel (⇒))
Con(ZF + ADR)⇔ Con(ZFC + ADR -hypothesis)
We continue our cataloguing of some more large cardinals through elementary embeddings.
Definition 4.9 (i) A cardinal κ is α-supercompact if there is a j : V −→e M with αM ⊆M .
(ii) κ is supercompact if it is α-supercompact for all α.
An embedding arising from a measurable cardinal κ in general only implies the closure of
M under κ sequences, so this definition only starts to have bite once α > κ. The closure under
all α-sequences is again a considerable strengthening over the “strong” hierarchy of principles. It
masks also a telling difference in the kind of embeddings: up to this point the embeddings j have
always been “continuous at κ+” meaning that sup(j“κ+) = j(κ+). If j is a 2κ-supercompact
embedding, this fails with sup(j“κ+) < j(κ+) occurring. Whilst looking a rather technical
difference this in fact introduces a wide variety of new phenomena. Current inner model theory
has a target of producing a good fine structural inner model of a supercompact cardinal, but this
target is not yet met. It can do so for strong cardinals, Woodin cardinal, Woodin limit of Woodin
cardinals, ..., but although we know what the inner models should look like for example, for
measurably Woodin cardinals, we are unable to prove they exist. The chief difficulty being the
inability to prove that sufficiently many ultrapowers of the models are wellfounded in order for
their construction to get off the ground. This has been dubbed the “iterability problem”.
Woodin has recently proposed versions of inner models constructed from a single supercom-
pact cardinal (dubbed ‘Ultimate L’) that would allow the importation to the model of witnesses
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for all large cardinals, including even larger ones, that may exist in V , in one stroke. However
establishing these models with the relevant properties is still a work-in-progress.
Continuing onwards we come to such larger cardinals, the extendible cardinals of Reinhardt
and Silver (see [29]):
Definition 4.10 (i) A cardinal κ is α-extendible if there are λ, j with j : Vκ+α −→e Vλ+α
∧ cp(j) = κ.
(ii) κ is extendible if it is α-extendible for all α.
Even 1-extendibility is a strong concept:
Lemma 4.11 If κ is 1-extendible, then it is superstrong (and there are many such below it.)
Lemma 4.12 If κ is extendible, it is supercompact; κ extendible implies Vκ ≺Σ3 V .
Ascending further:
Definition 4.13 A cardinal κ is huge if there is j : V −→e M with cp(j) = κ ∧ j(κ)M ⊆M .
However if we try to maximise the extendibility properties we run into inconsistency. Let
L∈˙,j˙ be the usual language with an additional class predicate j˙; let ZFCj be a formulation of
the axioms with the additional predicate symbol allowed into all instances of Separation and
Collection.
Theorem 4.14 (Kunen [15]) (ZFCj˙)
There is no non-trivial L∈˙-elementary embedding j : V −→e V .
It is unknown whether AC is necessary for this theorem (see below). The proof of Kunen’s
theorem is actually a direct ZFC result about sets:
Theorem 4.15 (Kunen) (ZFC) There is no non-trivial elementary embedding j : Vλ+2 −→e
Vλ+2.
The “2” is an essential artefact of the argument. That there may be a non-trivial j : Vλ+1 −→e
Vλ+1 is not known to be inconsistent; if this is to be the case, then κ0 = cp(j) < λ and it can be
shown that λ has cofinality ω, being sup{κ0, j(κ0), jj(k0), . . .}. There are now several proofs
of Kunen’s theorem - see Kanamori, [10].
For such Vλ+1 the model L(Vλ+1) and its possible elementary embeddings has become an
object of study, and is likely to be significant. Likewise recent work of Woodin has focussed
attention on the possibility of an embedding of V to itself being consistent with ZF without
choice. Generalisations of such principles are thus beyond the consistency strength of large car-
dinals considered with AC. It is perhaps then the case, that there is a choiceless realm of strong
axioms or large cardinals, lying in a region where AC fails, thus between the AC-world and
inconsistency. It is an interesting observation that there are no deep proofs of the inconsistency
of any putative large cardinal axiom yet proposed: usually a half a page at most is needed to
see off any inconsistent candidate. So perhaps instead of this picture of all inconsistency proofs
being of a simple nature, the (ZFj˙)-version of Kunen’s theorem, if true, may be the first example
where hard work has to be done.
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